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In 1907, AT&T President Theodore N. Vail proclaimed universal service to 
be a key corporate goal. The following year, at Vail's prodding, AT&T popular- 
ized this goal in a major publicity effort that historian Roland Marchand has 
termed "the first, the most persistent, and the most celebrated of the large-scale 
institutional advertising campaigns of the early twentieth century" [Marchand, 
1998]. Over the course of the next decade, Vail himself explored its ramifica- 
tions in a remarkable series of reports and addresses [Vail, 1917]. Though histo- 
rians quarrel about precisely what Vail meant by universal service, few doubt its 
importance. For the next three-quarters of a century, it played a major role in 
the firm's business trategy and was a central element of its corporate culture. 
Historical scholarship on universal service has been greatly influenced by 
the antitrust suit against AT&T that culminated in its breakup in 1984. While 
this work is often suggestive and revealing, it tends to be far more concerned 
with the consequences of universal service than with the context out of which 
it emerged. This paper-which, I should emphasize, is preliminary and 
exploratory, and an invitation to critique-points the discussion in a different 
direction. It has three sections. The first section surveys the literature on the 
origins of universal service. The second proposes an alternative account. The 
final section makes a few observations about the implications of this alterna- 
tive for the Galambosian "organizational synthesis"-and, in particular, for its 
characterization of the main lines of institutional development in the nine- 
teenth-century United States. 
Historical scholarship on the origins of universal service typically link the 
concept with the subject of inquiry. Historians of AT&T, for example, almost 
invariably trace it back to the beginnings of the firm. Characteristic of this 
genre are the essays collected in Ithiel de Sola Pool's Social Impact of the 
•lephone, a project that grew out of a conference that AT&T sponsored in the 
mid-1970s at MIT. Though Pool declared in his introduction that AT&T exert- 
ed no influence over the contents of this volume, it would be hard to imagine 
a scholarly work that was more congenial to the sensibilities of its patron [Pool, 
1977, p. x]. With minor variations, all of the essays in the volume share a sim- 
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ilar point of view, making it possible to treat them collectively as the product 
of a single mind. 
From a PoolJan standpoint, the origins of AT&T's commitment to univer- 
sal service could be found in the intentions of the founders of the firm. From 
the outset, these men-telephone inventor Alexander Graham Bell, telephone 
promoter Gardiner Greene Hubbard, and telephone manager Theodore N. 
Vail-envisioned that the new technology would eventually become incorpo- 
rated into an integrated network that, under a single management, would bring 
the promise of telephony to families as well as businesses throughout the coun- 
try and around the world. Given the prescience of Bell, Hubbard, and Vail, 
the subsequent rise of the Bell System was a "self-fulfilling prophecy" that 
sprang, as it were, more-or-less fully clad from the brow of its creators [Pool, 
1977, p. 132]. 
The key to the founders' success was their ability to comprehend the essen- 
tial nature of the new technology. They saw the future with "such clarity"-or 
so Pool contended-because of the congruence between their outlook and the 
"very technology of the telephone" [Pool, 1977, p. 8]. From a Poolian stand- 
point, it was but a short step from Bell's first telephone patent in 1876 to the 
establishment of AT&T as a long-distance subsidiary in 1885 to the consolida- 
tion of the Bell System as a legally sanctioned national monopoly in the 1910s. 
In this decidedly whiggish and resolutely triumphalist narrative, the rise of inde- 
pendent telephony was but a footnote, as was the role of law, public policy, 
and the regulatory state. 
When read today, fifteen years after the break-up of the Bell System, these 
essays can be read as proof texts of a kind of technological determinism that 
seems tartlingly hubristic and naive. The political message was plain. AT&T's 
greatness-or so explained John R. Pierce, a scientist at Bell Laboratories, and a 
contributor to the volume-was attributable to a unique combination of tech- 
nological virtuosity and visionary leadership. Both were imperiled by govern- 
mental meddling. Telephone networks, Pierce reminded us, were the "largest 
and most complex systems in the world." And the foremost of these networks 
was the Bell System. Yet, if it came to be imperiled by "drastic government 
actions" aimed at bringing it in line with "current ideology," it might swiftly 
"degenerate" in a very few years [Pool, 1977, pp. 181, 187]. Though Pierce was 
a bit vague about the kinds of degeneracy he had in mind, he expressed spe- 
cial concern about the evils of interconnection. Should some government reg- 
ulator, for example, have the temerity to permit telephone users to attach a 
non-Bell telephone to the network, serious injury or even electrocution might 
well be the result [Pool, 1977, p. 192]. 
Vestiges of the Poolian tradition lived on in George David Smith's_/lnatomy 
of a Business Strategy and Robert W. Garnet's 7•lephone Enterprise, the first two vol- 
umes of the Johns Hopkins/AT&T series in telephone history. Like the 
Poolians, Smith and Garnet found in the earliest years of the Bell Company 
the seeds of its later glory. For Smith, a key turning point was the acquisition 
of Western Electric in 1881-an event that set the stage for Bell's preeminence 
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in industrial research; for Garnet, it was the firm's establishment, beginning in 
the late 1870s, of close relations with the operating companies-a precursor to 
the Bell System. Interestingly enough, one historian who appeared to dissent 
from this view was Louis Galambos-the editor of the series. Indeed, in a 
notable essay on Vail, Galambos took care to distinguish his business trategy 
during his first career at Bell-which ended in his departure from the firm in 
1887-from the strategy that he pursued in his second career following his 
return in 1907 [Galambos, 1992]. 
Both Smith and Garnet grounded their monographs in the structural-func- 
tionalist framework that Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., used so effectively in the 
Visible Hand [John, 1997a]. Far different in approach was the fourth volume 
in the Hopkins/AT&T series-Kenneth Lipartito's study of telephony in the 
South. In this monograph, and also in a related series of articles, Lipartito 
moved from an internalist toward a contextualist understanding of Bell's strategy. 
It was not technology and markets, Lipartito contended, but skillful entrepre- 
neurship, in conjunction with an "almost irrational" commitment to intercon- 
nection, and-most important of all-the active cooperation of state regulatory 
bodies, that translated universal service into a reality [Lipartito, 1989a, p. 225; 
Lipartito, 1989b]. Lipartito did not reject outright the possibility that the ori- 
gins of universal service antedated Vail's articulation of this ideal in 1907. Yet 
his primary interest was the conjunction of events that Vail's return helped to 
inspire. Indeed, to a greater extent than any other historian who focused pri- 
marily on AT&T, he was open to the possibility that, had AT&T executives not 
proved so successful in manipulating the political setting, government regula- 
tors could conceivably have made a superior "public choice" [Lipartito, 1989b]. 
Historians whose main interest lies elsewhere than AT&T have been, per- 
haps not surprisingly, markedly less inclined to trace the origins of universal 
service to the founders of the firm. A case in point was Milton L. Mueller, 
Jr.'s., Universal Service, the most extensive analysis of the economic dimensions 
of universal service in American telephony during the opening years of the 
twentieth century [Mueller, 1997]. If the Poolians read at times a bit like defen- 
dants in the AT&T antitrust suit, Mueller was a star witness for the prosecu- 
tion. In the Vail era, Mueller explained, the concept of universal service had 
far more to do with the interconnection of existing telephone service than with 
the extension of telephone service to under-served regions. Only later would 
the concept become synonymous with the establishment of a nation-wide, low- 
cost, cross-subsidized residential phone network that, during the antitrust pro- 
ceedings, AT&T's champions misleadingly claimed to have been one of its 
defining features all along. 
How, then, did Mueller explain the origins of universal service? Its true 
creators, he contended, were the swarm of daring, imaginative, and (at least 
implicitly) socially progressive independent telephone promoters who, follow- 
ing the lapse of the Bell telephone patents in 1894, established telephone serv- 
ice for the many regions that Bell managers had declined to serve. Given 
Mueller's theme, it is, perhaps, not entirely surprising that his book appeared 
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in a series that was sponsored by the conservative, free-market-oriented 
American Enterprise Institute. After all, it can be read-which, indeed, seems 
to have been Mueller's intention-as a brief for today's telecommunications 
upstarts, and a forthright critique of any effort to re-regulate the industry fol- 
lowing the breakup of AT&T. 
Equally critical of Poolian orthodoxy was Claude S. Fischer's America 
Callin& a prize-winning study of telephone users in the period prior to the 
Second World War [Fischer, 1992]. Framing his inquiry as an exploration of 
the "consumption junction," Fischer contended, predictably enough, that it 
was here that the promise of universal service was first realized. For Fischer, 
the true champions of universal service were neither Bell managers, as the 
Poolians and Lipartito had claimed, nor independent telephone ntrepreneurs, 
as Mueller had contended. Rather, they were the millions of rural and small 
town telephone patrons who pioneered in the social (as opposed to the com- 
mercial) uses of the telephone. It was these ordinary Americans, Fischer con- 
cluded, who finally persuaded Bell managers to stop thinking of the telephone 
as little more than a telegraph that talked, and to embrace fully its actual poten- 
tial as a medium for two-way social communication. 
Like Lipartito-and, to a certain extent, the Poolians-Fischer conceived of 
the Bell managers' outlook as a mindset with a distinctive cultural cast. Yet 
Fischer treated this mindset as an obstacle to be overcome rather than an asset 
to be exploited. Trapped as they were by their blind reliance on inappropriate 
telegraphic analogies-or so Fischer assumed-Bell managers failed to recognize 
the actual potential of the new technology. Not until the 1920s, fifty years after 
the initial establishment of the industry, would customers living in rural locales 
finally show them the way. Or, to put it somewhat differently, for Fischer, no 
less than for the Poolians, the founders of the telephone industry were tech- 
nological determinists-only, now, technological determinism was not a func- 
tional given but, instead, a cultural norm. 
Existing scholarship on the origins of universal service highlights the 
salience of technology and markets, and devotes little attention to develop- 
ments that antedated the commercialization of the telephone. Yet long before 
the 1870s, there already existed an expansive rationale for communications pol- 
icy that owed little to electrical science or consumer demand, yet which would 
exert a major influence on the ideal of universal service as it would later come 
to be understood. Ever since the campaign for "cheap postage" in the 1840s, 
countless pamphlets, magazine articles, and government reports had hailed the 
inexpensive, uniform, and geographically extensive distribution of social corre- 
spondence as a public good. And ever since the passage of the Post Office Act 
of 1792, the government had moved vigorously to hasten the rapid transmis- 
sion of time-specific information on commerce and public affairs throughout 
the length and breadth of the United States. This civic rationale for commu- 
nications policy had little influence at Western Union-which was, in the 1870s, 
the largest elegraph firm in the country. Yet it was taken for granted at the 
Post Office Department, which remained, throughout the nineteenth century, 
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the largest and most influential element of the information infrastructure in 
the United States [John, 1995; John, forthcoming]. 
The existence of this civic rationale for communications policy best 
explains the origins of universal service as a business strategy at AT&T. 
Universal service was, at bottom a cultural heritage with an unmistakably polit- 
ical cast, rather than an intrinsic attribute of the new technology, or a fortu- 
itous byproduct of the impersonal workings of the competitive market. 
The civic rationale for communications policy had a particularly lasting 
influence on Hubbard-the telephone promoter who, in addition to funding 
Bell's early experiments in telephony and making several key early administra- 
tive decisions at the Bell Company, recruited Vail to become Bell's first gener- 
al manager. 
Hubbard's preoccupation with universal service began well before his 
involvement in telephony. Its impetus was his dissatisfaction with what he took 
to be the unduly narrow, business-oriented strategy that Western Union offi- 
cials pursued following the consolidation of the firm in 1866 as a deJ•cto 
national monopoly. Western Union, Hubbard believed, had conspicuously 
failed to realize the democratic potential of the new technology. From his 
standpoint, its rates were too high, its service too limited, and its offices too 
few. "As a telegraph for business, where dispatch is essential and price is of lit- 
tle account"-Hubbard declared in 1883, articulating a position that he had 
held for fifteen years-"the Western Union system is unrivaled; but as a tele- 
graph for the people it is signal failure" [Hubbard, 1883, p. 522]. To rectify this 
situation, Hubbard lobbied Congress repeatedly to charter a "postal telegraph" 
that would underbid the telegraph giant and provide universal service for all. 
Hubbard's critique of Western Union calls into question Fischer's assertion 
that Bell's founders were trapped by telegraphic analogies. How, one wonders, 
could this be true of Hubbard-Western Union's most insistent critic? 
Hubbard's pronouncements also raise questions about Mueller's blanket claim 
that the concept of universal service dated back no further than the competi- 
tive flurry of the 1890s and the 1900s. Few students of nineteenth-century 
communications policy would find such a claim persuasive. After all, univer- 
sal access to information on commerce and public affairs had been a goal of 
postal policy for over a century-and, indeed, had furnished Hubbard with 
much of the rhetorical ammunition that he deployed in his struggle against 
Western Union [John, 1998]. 
Hubbard's critique of Western Union's business strategy led him, pre- 
dictably enough, to establish the telephone industry on a broader and more 
inclusive foundation. In marked contrast to telegraph officials, Hubbard took 
it for granted that, eventually, the new technology would be administered as a 
public utility, and that it would serve a large, and constantly growing, clientele. 
Later Bell investors would be decidedly more restrained in their assumptions 
about the industry's future course, particularly in the years immediately pre- 
ceding the expiration of the key Bell patents. Yet Hubbard's vision was never 
entirely eclipsed, and, beginning in 1907, would reemerge, in a distinct, yet rec- 
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ognizable guise, in Vail's commitment to universal service. By the First World 
War, the Bell System would come to resemble the other network technologies 
with which Hubbard was familiar-such as the gas and water works that were 
beginning to proliferate in American cities and towns, and which, in the years 
prior to his initial involvement in telephony, Hubbard himself had done a 
good deal to promote [Carlson, 1994]. 
Hubbard never doubted that the telephone would be quickly adopted by 
banks, hotels, and retail establishments of all kinds. Yet he was equally confi- 
dent that it would one day prove useful within the home. Middle-class 
Americans like himself-as Hubbard knew well, and as he had frequently con- 
tended in his essays on telegraphic reform-were one market that Western 
Union had conspicuously ignored. To encourage homes as well as offices to 
install telephones, Hubbard offered residential users special ow rates. And to 
promote its widespread use, he offered subscribers unlimited monthly service 
for a single fee. This rate structure had the advantage of being relatively sim- 
ple to administer. Yet other, message-unit-based pricing schemes could have 
been, and were, devised, particularly in Europe. 
Alexander Graham Bell echoed Hubbard's conviction that the telephone 
would play a major role within the home. In particular, he envisioned the 
telephone replacing the speaking tubes, pull bells, and other devices that well- 
to-do Americans had come to rely on to maintain contact with their house- 
hold staff. Once householders became accustomed to the new technology, he 
reasoned, they would urge its extension to stores, offices, and other similar 
locations that would then be linked together by a central exchange. In an age 
when even modest middle-class households employed one or more servants, 
this was an ingenious strategy, and one well calculated to insure that the 
arbiters of taste and fashion would come to regard the new technology in a 
favorable light. To make his point, Bell cited gas and water companies- 
though, significantly, not district telegraph firms-as prototypes for the new 
enterprise [Bell, 1878, pp. 89-92]. 
Theodore N. Vail's approach to telephony was predicated on a similarly 
expansive conception of its potential. Indeed, like Hubbard's, it owed a good 
deal more to postal precedent han to the example of Western Union. This 
was true even though Vail had himself worked for a time as a Western Union 
telegraph operator, while his cousin, Alfred Vail, had been a key figure in the 
early years of the telegraph industry. 
Prior to Vail's arrival at Bell, the most formative experience in his adult 
life-and, indeed, the reason Hubbard offered him a position in the Bell 
Company-had been his successful tenure as the general superintendent of the 
Railway Mail Service. Hubbard met Vail during a stint that Hubbard served 
as chairman of a special postal commission that Congress established in 1876 
to devise a better method for allocating railway mail pay. Vail worked closely 
with Hubbard and prepared an elaborate report on postal costs [Vail, 1876, pp. 
8-24; Hubbard, 1877]. Hubbard was duly impressed with Vail's energy, imag- 
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ination, and capacity for abstract hought, and in 1878 persuaded him to bolt 
the government to become the first general manager at Bell. 
The Railway Mail Service had been established in 1869 and, under the 
capable leadership of a series of gifted administrators-including Vail-quickly 
became a key element of the information infrastructure of the industrial age. 
The purpose of the institution was to speed the movement of the mail by shift- 
ing its routing from stationary distribution centers (where it had been located 
since 1800), to moving railroad cars (where it would remain for much of the 
next century). In its day, the continuous, train-based sorting scheme that the 
railway mail clerks oversaw was widely hailed as one of the wonders of the age. 
Writing in 1925, Bell historian Arthur Pound drew attention to the signif- 
icance of Vail's years at railway mail [Pound, 1926, pp. 17-18]. So, too, did 
Robert Sobel in a perceptive biographical sketch [Sobel, 1974]. The connec- 
tion was also noted by John Brooks in what remains the single best volume on 
the history of the telephone industry [Brooks, 1976]. Yet most recent studies 
of telephone history-including all of the works discussed above-say nothing 
about it at all. 
How, then, might Vail's years in the Railway Mail Service have influenced 
his business strategy at Bell? Several parallels are suggestive. At the Bell 
Company, as at railway mail, Vail was firmly committed to retaining complete 
control over the communications circuit. Like most postal officers, Vail 
believed that it was incumbent to guarantee that the mail remain under the 
control of individuals who could be assumed to display a proper degree of 
"fealty" to the Post Office Department. For this reason, he opposed the prac- 
tice (which dated back to the stagecoach era) of requiring mail contractors to 
convey the mail between the train and the post office. This custom, Vail 
warned, exposed the mail to "all kind of irregularities," since it virtually guar- 
anteed that it would be handled in a haphazard manner by men whose minds 
were on something else [Annual Report, 1877, p. 151]. Later, as a Bell execu- 
tive, Vail would display an analogous commitment to systems integration. 
Following the Bell breakup, it has come to seem odd to treat this "network 
mystique" as a functional response to a technological imperative. Vail's expe- 
rience at railway mail suggests an alternative explanation. 
To better coordinate the routing of the mail once it was under government 
control, Vail devised a number of novel administrative procedures and spon- 
sored several conferences with his eight divisional superintendents. One such 
meeting, in September 1877, lasted a full week. The purpose of this conference, 
Vail explained, was to improve relations between the government and the rail- 
roads, standardize the work of the various divisions, minimize routing errors, 
and devise uniform procedures [History, 1885, pp. 114, 184]. Later, at AT&T, 
Vail would make similar organizational summits a prominent feature of the 
firm's corporate culture. Interestingly, there is little evidence that, at this time, 
similar meetings were held at Western Union. 
No feature of the Railway Mail Service was more distinctive than its esprit 
de corps. Here, too, was a cultural norm that anticipated, and that may well have 
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helped to shape, the meritocratic ethos that was such a distinctive feature of 
the Bell System under Vail. Unlike much of the rest of the Post Office 
Department-which remained tied to the patronage-based mass parties-the 
Railway Mail Service was administered on civil service principles. Promotions 
were based on performance, and all clerks were required to take periodic tests 
to demonstrate their skills. "Upon the careful performance of their duties," 
Vail declared in 1876, "are dependent interests of a magnitude that cannot be 
estimated." After all, a "single error" on the clerks' part, resulting in the "delay 
or missending of a single letter, no matter how unimportant it may look, may 
result disastrously to some individual or corporation" [,4nnual Rqort, 1876, p. 
167]. On the fidelity of the railway mail clerks, Vail added two years later, were 
dependent interests "beyond estimate" that they had "fully met." If, then, the 
United States was to boast a postal service of which there was "none superior" 
then to "these employes is due their share of the credit" •4nnual Rqort, 1878, 
p. 242]. 
Few features of railway mail intrigued Vail more than the Fast Mail, a high- 
speed mail link between New York and Chicago that cut the transit time to a 
mere twenty-five hours-a remarkable achievement hat was, in its day, as well 
known as the Pony Express. Though Vail himself did not establish the Fast 
Mail, he oversaw its expansion and took great interest in its administration. 
The project was, Vail declared in one of his annual reports, of comparable 
import to the initial establishment of the railway mail. Every day, he proudly 
reported, fast mail clerks sorted no fewer than 529,000 pieces of mail [•tnnual 
Rqort, 1876, pp. 163, 165]. 
Vail recognized that the Fast Mail project was experimental, yet he was 
confident that it would prove its worth by-among other things-speeding up 
mail delivery throughout the rest of the country, and ratcheting up adminis- 
trative standards in the remaining distribution centers and feeder lines. Later, 
as the first president of AT&T-the Bell Company's long-distance subsidiary- 
Vail would champion long-distance telephony for similar reasons-seeing in it a 
competitive advantage that would enable Bell to establish a level of service that 
no competitor could match. 
Vail's involvement with the Fast Mail brought him into contact with 
William Vanderbilt, the president of the New York and Hudson Railroad. 
Frustrated by a sudden reduction in mail pay, Vanderbilt briefly tossed the 
mailbags off his railroad cars-a gesture that Vail regarded as deeply offensive 
to the citizens who lived in the immediate vicinity, and entirely out-of-keeping 
with the public-service thos that had shaped postal policy for eighty years. 
The government, Vail declared at one point, should be invested with an 
"absolute power" to determine which trains should carry the mail, and how 
much room should be provided to facilitate its sorting [•tnnual Rqort, 1877, p. 
151]. Vail always opposed government ownership of the telephone industry. 
Yet he favored its regulation-and, indeed, was convinced that intelligent gov- 
ernment oversight was not only inevitable, but desirable. Here, too, was a habit 
of mind that may well have been shaped by his years at railway mail. 
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One of the central tenets of the "organizational synthesis" that Louis 
Galambos has done so much to popularize is the assertion that, at some point 
after 1880, American society assumed a new and different form [Galambos, 
1970, 1983]. Prior to 1880, Galambos contended, institutional development 
had been primarily extensive in the sense that it involved the settlement of the 
vast North American interior. This process involved a multitude of Arnericans, 
virtually all of whom were engaged in ventures no larger th0aa the artisanal shop 
or the family farm. With the exception of the railroad, large-scale organiza- 
tions-in business or government-were unknown. Only after 1880, with the 
rise of the modern corporation, would this trajectory change in a fundamental 
way. Henceforth, institutional development would become intensive. Rapidly, 
and in ways that no one could possibly have foreseen, the country was trans- 
formed with the elaboration of administrative hierarchies, first in business and 
then in government. America's rendevous with destiny had come-and it was 
a rendevous not with liberalism, but with bureaucracy. 
The Galambosian bifurcation of the American past into pre-bureaucratic 
and post-bureaucratic phases has a certain intuitive appeal. Indeed, in various 
ways, it builds fruitfully upon-and, indeed, supplies a ParsonJan gloss to-the 
frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner -one of the most venerable and 
seemingly indispensable of historiographical constructs. Yet, whatever its 
strengths, it renders invisible large-scale undertakings uch as the Railway Mail 
Service-and, in this way, obscures the origins of concepts such as universal 
service. The Railway Mail Service is anomalous on two counts. Not only is it 
an "intensive" enterprise that antedated the great divide of 1880, but it is also 
a governmental institution rather than a business firm. 
Vail's tenure at the Railway Mail Service-and, more broadly, the civic 
rationale for universal service to which he had been exposed during his years 
in the government-suggests hat, long before 1880, the government-and, in 
particular, the federal government-had been a major seedbed of administrative 
innovation. This conclusion may perplex late-twentieth century Americans- 
accustomed, as we are, to according causal primacy to economic and techno- 
logical phenomena. Yet it would have startled neither Vail nor his more 
thoughtful contemporaries. Only after 1880, as James L. Hutson has recently 
suggested, would Americans began to regard economic phenomena as more 
fundamental than political processes as agents of change [Hutson, 1993; John, 
1997b]. The influence of Vail's tenure in the Railway Mail Service upon his 
subsequent career in telephony suggests that it may well be time to reconsider 
the merits of this older view. Only then, perhaps, will it be possible to under- 
stand the civic origins of universal service-and, more broadly, the cultural and 
political context out of which the modern corporation emerged. 
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